Does the volatility of commodity prices reflect macroeconomic uncertainty?

Marc Joëts ^{1,2} Valérie Mignon ² Tovonony Razafindrabe ²


¹IPAG Business School ²U. Paris West

May 2015, FIME Seminar

Over the past decades: commodity prices have experienced an exceptional volatility


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- Welfare consequence? (Fattouh and Mahadeva 2014; Joëts and Razafindrabe 2015).

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- What could be the effect on commodity prices?

Main questions

• What is the importance of macro uncertainty on commodity prices movements? (high and low uncertainty states)

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- What is the proportion of macro uncertainty in price uncertainty?
- What shocks make price more uncertain? (supply, demand, or speculation)

Main results

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- A significant component of oil price uncertainty is both macro uncertainty (2nd moment) and economic activity (1st moment), especially in 2005-08 period.
- Oil price uncertainty in 1980s is mainly supply-driven (1985-86 Saudi Arabia).
- On the whole speculative shocks do not lead to oil price uncertainty (very limited contribution during the 2007-08 episode).

Outline of the presentation

- Related literature
- The model: empirical strategy
- Impact of macroeconomic uncertainty across states (nonlinear IRF)
- Does maturity matter?
- Does macroeconomic uncertainty generate commodity uncertainty?
- Distinguishing between different types of shocks in oil price uncertainty: uncertainty; supply; demand; and speculative shocks.
- Discussion: The crude oil price decrease paradox in June-Dec 2014 (Arezki-Blanchard 2014 vs. Baumeister-Kilian 2015).

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 - \bullet empirical paper: Van Robays 2013 \to volatility as a proxy for macro uncertainty.

Related literature: unsolved questions

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- Adequate proxy of macro uncertainty?
- Effect of macro uncertainty on various commodity markets / on distinct maturities?
- Does macro uncertainty lead to price uncertainty?
- How much macro uncertainty in price uncertainty?
- How much fundamental and speculative shocks in price uncertainty?

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where $i=1,...,N_y$, $E\left(\left.\left|J_t\right.\right\rangle\right)$ is the conditional expectation of y_{jt} , J_t the available information at time t, $U_{jt}^y\left(h\right)$ is the conditional volatility of the purely unforectastable component of y_{jt} .

$$U_{t}^{y}(h) \equiv p \lim_{N_{y} \to \infty} \sum_{j=1}^{N_{y}} w_{j} U_{jt}^{y}(h) \equiv E_{w} \left[U_{jt}^{y}(h) \right].$$

• Aggregating over j individual uncertainty measures $U_{jt}^{y}(h)$ equally weighted by w_{j} leads to the aggregate macroeconomic uncertainty:

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 - Onstruct macro uncertainty from the individual uncertainty.

Figure: Jurado et al. (2014)'s macro uncertainty measure







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
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
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- Theoretical properties: (i) mainly demand-driven, (ii) forward-looking, and (iii) level (variability) increases (decreases) with h.

Uncertainty may be a nonlinear propagator of shocks across markets

$$Y_{t} = \mu_{1} + A^{1} Y_{t} + B^{1} (L) Y_{t-1} + (\mu_{2} + A^{2} Y_{t} + B^{2} (L) Y_{t-1}) I_{t} (c_{t-d} \ge \gamma) + u_{t}$$

where Y_t is a vector of endogeneous variables containing commodity markets (each group respectively) and a measure of uncertainty which models different states; the threshold variable c_{t-d} is function of uncertainty.

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- variables ordering (commodity first): commodity responds to change in macro only with a delay (Kilian and Vega 2011).
- endogeneity problem of the threshold: three-period moving average (persistence) of our one-period-lagged threshold variable (switch across states with a delay).

The model: from macro to commodity uncertainty (III)

Commodity prices uncertainty indicator:

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 - $\textbf{ 0} \ \, \text{Forecast of} \,\, c_{t+h} \,\, \text{conditionally to macro uncertainty} \,\, \big(E \, [c_{t+h} \, | \Omega_t, u^u_t \,] \big).$

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 \Rightarrow when commodity price uncertainty coincides with periods of macro uncertainty: transfert of uncertainty.

Results (Ia)

Impact of macro uncertainty across states (nonlinear IRF)


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Figure: Impact of macro uncertainty on crude oil price (positive two-standard-deviation shocks)




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
Figure: Uncertainty effect in oil price across maturity (cumulative positive shocks across maturity)



Does macroeconomic uncertainty generate oil price uncertainty?


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Figure: Oil price uncertainty



Note: Graph depicts oil price uncertainty at 1 month. Horizontal line corresponds to the 1.65 standard deviation above the mean of the serie. Gray bands represent macroeconomic uncertainty periods as described by Jurado et al. (2014). Volatility (green line) is proxied by the daily squared returns of prices.

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


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How much macroeconomic uncertainty in oil price uncertainty?


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Figure: Historical decomposition analysis



What types of shocks make oil price more uncertain: Demand, supply, and speculation?

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
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
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 - Arezki and Blanchard (2014): shock to oil price exceptations after June 2014 (surprise increases in global oil prod: Lybian oil & OPEC announcement).
 - Baumeister and Kilian (2015): few large oil market shocks after June 2014 (more than half of the decline was predictable) & a demand shock in Dec (weakening economy).

What does our oil price uncertainty index tell us about the price decrease?

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• Macro uncertainty impacts commodity prices:

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 - different between markets: oil price is more sensitive.
 - different across maturity: oil price is more sensitive to SR uncertainty (real option effect?).

- Macro uncertainty impacts commodity prices:
 - different between markets: oil price is more sensitive.
 - different across maturity: oil price is more sensitive to SR uncertainty (real option effect?).
- Macro uncertainty leads to commodity prices uncertainty during the 2007-09 period.

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- The decline of oil price between June and Dec 2014 was predictable (BK are right!).

Thank you!